GDF Weapons Procurement Policy and Practice
"Last and Worst?" - GDF materiel procurement policy and practice by Prof Django Auden, Barnum Chair of Applied Logistics, University of Banjul "One does not want to bite the hand that feeds (literally, where would we be without them?), but all is not well with the GDF. The media’s love affair with the idealistic internationalism and pragmatic expertise of the GDF’s emergency relief and reconstruction efforts should not blind us to the truth and the truth cannot be rationed out like anti-malarial pills. The GDF has done wonderful work, simply wonderful. One pauses before risking any analysis, let alone criticism of it. But if the last forty years have taught us anything, it is that sacred cows are a luxury we simply cannot afford. The GDF is not beyond criticism and doesn’t always do the right thing. Archbishop Verna was surely justified in his comments that the GDF’s appetite for peace has led it into at least temporary alliance with some very shady regimes who have tidied up their acts just enough to look like a responsible aid donor. However this document will restrict itself to just one area of the GDF’s activity, one which this author at least feels competent to comment on. For me, most glaringly, the GDF’s choice of equipment, weaponry and vehicles is not beyond reproach. The GDF Procurement Commissariat themselves have a point when they complained that the armaments selection and contract award process resembled not so much a search for the best equipment, but rather an pork system that politicians used to put money in the pockets of their closest supporters. This is to ignore the truism that the GDF while international - even supranational - is not homogenous. Some elements within it have consistently lagged behind the others in overall performance and practical skills. Some units have been consistently ill-equipped. The GDF is entirely risk-averse in its choice of equipment. Reliability is favoured over median field performance. One disappointed weapons manufacturer and sceptical donor observed bitterly that the GDF would rather use reliable pointed sticks than rifles that might jam. The GDF has often been forced into a primarily military role (euphemistically deemed “peace creation” by the silver-tongued PR spin doctor hacks), but this has tended to mean they fought against forces less well equipped and organised than themselves. This has not always been the case. Narcotics/Pharmaceuticals Cartels are often better equipped, trained and led than local GDF detachments although it should be admitted that those GDF detachments were often engineering specialists rather than the dedicated combat forces more commonly deployed today. The GDF’s pilots have been consistently excellent, no matter what tired old kite they have been required to fly. The Magog heavy Lift chopper is obsolete, let’s admit it. It’s almost painful to see a modern force using it. Apologists may point out that it still works, but given the recent startling advances in lift technology, is it really right that the world’s “first and best” should be relying on decades-old airframes? “Last and worst”, surely? Of course the Magog is an icon, familiar to us all from our childhood. Its power plants and avionics have been upgraded several times over the years and it cannot be denied that it serves a purpose but is it really right that the GDF should still be using it? The GDF started off using Kalashnikov rifles, not because they were the best, but because they were the cheapest, the most reliable, and ammunition was ubiquitous. The GDF remains a ruthlessly conservative, almost reactionary force. GDF Armorers often joke that the GDF will only field a weapon when they’re sure that everyone else owns one first. The GDF has recently been faced with combat opponents with substantially superior equipment viz Narcotics/Pharma Cartels, Commercialist Fundamentalists (“Commies”), Market Liberators, Liberal Secessionists, oligarch private militia and private security firms specialising in the protection of religious and commercial entities. These opponents are usually far better equipped than the GDF, with access to the latest technology and privately-developed equipment tailored to their specific needs. They don’t need to worry about how their equipment can be mass-produced, or suddenly flown to the Caucuses or Polynesia or left in a shed in Darfur for three months. Why can’t the GDF have specialist equipment? Why can’t it field small teams with non-mass-produced gear and weaponry? It has the transport assets to move anything it wants almost anywhere in the world almost straight away." Category:Lore